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ANALYSIS AND ANALYTICITY 
THEODORE W. SCHICK, JR. 
In this paper, I attempt to solve the paradox of 
analysis by eliminating certain ambiguities that have 
have plagued theories of property-identity and 
proposition-identity. 
The paradox of analysis may be explicated as 
follows. To give an analysis of a term is to define 
it. Thus, in an analysis, both the term being analyzed 
(the analysandum) and the term doing the analyzing (the 
analysans) will have the same meaning, i.e. express the 
same concept. But if they have the same meaning, they 
should be intersubstitutable salva veritate, for a 
substitution that does not change the meaning of a 
sentence should not change its truth value. 
Unfortunately, however, they are not intersubstitutable 
salva veritate; e.g., "Male sibling is the analysis of 
brother" is true while "Brother is the analysis of 
brother" is false. Thus analysis contexts seem to 
require that the analysans and the analysandum both are 
and are not identical, and that is paradoxical. 
The foregoing is what might be called the 
"metaphysical version" of the paradox, for it deals 
solely with the relations between the concepts involved 
in an analysis. The most popular version of the 
paradox is what might be called the "epistemological 
version" of the paradox, for it deals with the 
knowledge we gain from an analysis. The classic 
statement of this version of the paradox was given by 
Charles Langford: 
The paradox of analysis is to the effect that, 
if the verbal expression representing the 
analysandum has the same meaning as the verbal 
expression representing the analysans, the 
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analysis states a bare identity and is 
trivial, but if the two verbal expressions do 
not have .the same meaning, the analysis is 
incorrect. 
In other words if an analysis is correct, it is 
trivial, i.e. it does not convey any real information. 
But if it is not trivial, i.e. if the analysans and the 
analysandum are not identical, it is not an analysis. 
Moore argues that the only way to avoid this 
paradox is to admit that analyses are about expressions 
as well as about concepts. He writes: 
I think that, in order to explain the fact 
that, even if 'to be a brother is to be a male 
sibling' is true, yet nevertheless this 
statement is not the same as the statement 'to 
be a brother is to be a brother,' one must 
suppose that both sentences are in some sense 
about the expressions used as well as about 
the concept of being a brother. 
But to construe analysis as being about expressions 
is to make philosophical theories language-bound. That 
is, it makes translation of philosophical theories 
across different languages impossible. Consider the 
sentences: 
(1) Male sibling is the analysis of brother, 
and (2) "Male sibling" is the analysis of 
"brother." 
Sentence (1) is not about the expressions "Male 
sibling" and "brother" while sentence (2) is. A German 
translation of (2) would not give a German ignorant of 
English the same information as would a German 
translation of (1). But it would seem that 
philosophical insights should be translatable across 
languages. Thus if the intuition that philosophy is 
about concepts and not about language is to be 
preserved, another solution must be found. 
By recognizing two distinct types of property and 
proposition identity, the paradox can be avoided. 
Properties may be either "structurally" or 
"compositionally" identical to one another depending on 
what properties they "contain." This view can be 
stated more precisely as follows: 
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1. P is a property if and only if it is 
possible that there is something that 
exemplifies P. 
2. Property (concept) P explicitly contains 
property (concept) Q if and ogly if 
necessarily, in order to apprehend P one 
must apprehend Q. 
For example, the concept male sibling explicitly 
contains the concept male, for in order to apprehend 
the concept male sibling, one must apprehend the 
concept male. 
3. Property (concept) P implicitly contains 
property (concept) Q if and only if (a) P 
does not explicitly contain Q and (b) 
necessarily, whoever has P is such that 
were he to apprehend Q, he would accept 
the proposition that all P's are Q. 
For example, the concept brother implicitly contains 
the concept male, for necessarily whoever has the 
concept brother is such that were he to apprehend the 
concept male, he would accept the proposition that all 
brothers are male. 
4. Property P is compositionally identical 
to property Q if and only if P implicitly 
contains every property that is 
implicitly and explicitly contained by Q 
and vice versa. 
For example, the property brother is compositionally 
identical to the property male sibling. 
5. Property P is structurally identical to 
property Q if and only if P explicitly 
contains every property that is 
explicitly contained by Q and vice versa. 
For example, the property expressed by this token of 
"brother" is structurally identical to the property 
expressed by this token of "brother." 
Analogously, propositions may be either 
structurally or compositionally identical to one 
another depending on what propositions they contain. 
This view can be stated more precisely as follows: 
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6. P is a proposition if and only if it is 
possible that there is someone who 
believes P. 
7. Proposition P explicitly contains the 
proposition Q if and only if necessarily 
in order to apprehend P one must 
apprehend Q. 
For example, the proposition snow is white and coal is 
black explicitly contains the proposition snow is white 
and the proposition coal is black. 
8. Proposition P implicitly contains the 
proposition Q if and only if (a) P does 
not explicitly contain Q, and (b) 
necessarily, whoever accepts P is such 
that were he to apprehend Q, he would 
accept the subjunctive conditional: if P 
were true, then Q would be true. 
For example, the proposition snow is white implicitly 
contains the proposition something is white. 
9. Proposition P is compositionally identi-
cal to proposition Q if and only if P 
implicitly contains every property and is 
implicitly and explicitly contained by Q 
and vice versa. 
For example, the proposition John is a brother is 
compositionally identical to the proposition John is a 
male sibling. 
10. Proposition P is structurally identical 
to proposition Q if and only .if P 
explicitly contains every property that 
is explicitly contained by Q and vice 
versa. 
For example, the proposition snow is white and coal is 
black is structurally identical to the proposition coal 
is black and snow is white. 
Kant was the first to characterize analytic 
statements as those in which the predicate is contained 
in the subject. He was also the first to draw a 
distinction between overt and covert conceptual 
containment. In the statement "All bodies are bodies," 
the predicate is overtly contained in the subject. In 
the statement "All bodies are extended," the predicate 
is covertly contained in the subject. Unfortunately, 
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his characterization of analyticity in terms of 
conceptual containment is rather vague. An analytic 
statement, he writes, adds "nothing through the 
predicate to the concept of the subject, but merely 
breaks it up into those constituent concepts that have 
all along been thought in it." The analysis of 
explicit and implicit conceptual containment offered 
above, however, avoids this vagueness and captures, 1 
believe, what Kant had in mind with his distinction 
between overt and covert conceptual containment. 
Perhaps the notions of compositional and structural 
identity can be elucidated by means of an analogy. One 
can apprehend a concept without apprehending its 
constituents just as one can percieve a mosaic without 
perceiving each of its pieces. By changing one's 
focus, however, one can perceive the pieces of the 
mosaic. But in that case, what is before one's mind 
will have a different structure or pattern than that 
which was before one's mind when one was perceiving the 
gestalt of the mosaic, although it will be composed of 
the same parts. Similarly, when one "focuses" on or 
attends to the constituents of a concept, what he 
apprehends will be structurally distinct from what he 
apprehends when he "focuses" on or attends to the 
concept itself, although it will be compositionally 
identical to it. 
Consider an ambiguous figure like the duck-rabbit. 
What one sees when one sees the duck aspect is not 
structurally identical to what one sees when he sees 
the rabbit aspect, for a duck shape is not identical to 
a rabbit shape. Yet those two aspects are 
compositionally identical, for they are composed of the 
same lines. Similarly, what one apprehends when he 
apprehends the concept male sibling is not identical to 
what one apprehends when he apprehends the concept 
brother, for one can apprehend the one without 
apprehending the other. Yet the two concepts are 
compositionally identical, for they implicitly contain 
the same properties. 
The notion of "sameness" is notoriously vague. 
What the foregoing examples suggest is that the 
vaguenes of the phrase "apprehends the same thing" is 
analogous to the vagueness of the phrase "sees the same 
thing." When one person sees the duck-rabbit figure as 
a duck and another sees it as a rabbit, do they see the 
same thing? In one sense, yes; in another sense, no. 
They see the same lines, but they do not see them in 
the same way. Similarly, when one person apprehends 
the concept male sibling and another apprehends the 
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concept brother, do they apprehend the same thing? 
Again, in one sense, yes; in another sense, no. They 
apprehend the same point in logical space, as it were, 
but they do not apprehend it in the same way. The 
distinction between compositional and structural 
identity tries to capture the difference between these 
two senses of "apprehends the same thing." 
The foregoing distinctions pave the way for the 
following solution to the paradox of analysis: 
11. X is an analysis of Y (where X and Y 
stand for properties or propositions) if 
and only if (a) X and Y are logically 
equivalent, (b) X is implicitly contained 
in Y, (c) X explicitly contains more 
concepts than Y, and (d) none of the 
concepts (or propositions) explicitly 
contained in X is logically equivalent to 
Y. 
On this view, then, the proposition X is an 
analysis of Y is true only if X and Y are 
compositionally identical but not structurally 
identical. In the context "Male sibling is the 
analysis of brother," "brother" cannot be substituted 
for "male sibling," for the concepts expressed by the 
two tokens of "brother" would then be structurally 
identical, and that is ruled out by condition (b). 
Hence, the paradox is avoided. 
The paradox arose because the type of identity 
involved in an analysis was unspecified. Once it is 
realized that the analysans must only be 
compositionally identical to and cannot be structurally 
identical to the analysandum, the paradox disappears. 
The traditional view that the analysans and the 
analysandum have the same meaning can be maintained as 
long as it is realized that "meaning" here means the 
concept or proposition expressed by a term and "same" 
here means compositionally identical and not 
structurally identical. 
Analysis is an a-symmetrical, non-reflexive 
relation. That is to say, if A is the analysis of B, 
then B cannot be the analysis of A, nor can B be the 
analysis of B. Analysis flows in only one direction, 
so to speak. As we have seen, previous conceptions of 
analysis could not account for this directionality. 
This one can. 
235 
In an analysis, the analysans must be logically 
equivalent to the analysandum. But there are many 
properties and propositions that are logically 
equivalent and yet do not stand in the relation of 
analysis. For example, although the propositions 2+2=4 
and 3+3=6 are logically equivalent, 3+3=6 cannot be 
considered to be the analysis of 2+2=4 because 3+3=6 is 
not implicitly contained in 2+2=4, i.e. one may 
apprehend both propositions and yet not accept the 
subjunctive conditional that if it were true that 
2+2=4, then it would be true that 3+3=6 because the 
truth of 3+3=6 is not conditional upon the truth of 
2+2=4. 
The properties of having a shape and having a size 
are logically equivalent, and having a shape is 
implicitly contained in having a size, but having a 
shape cannot be considered to be the analysis of having 
a size, for an analysis should "break down" a concept 
into its constituent concepts and there is no such 
breaking down here. Having a shape and having a size 
are on the same level, so to speak. Condition (c) 
rules out equivalences such as this, and thus preserves 
the intuition that the analysans must be more complex 
than the analysandum. 
Although the property of being shaped and colored 
is logically equivalent to the property of having a 
size, is implicitly contained in the property of having 
a size, and contains more properties than the property 
of having a size, it still cannot be considered to be 
an analysis of the property of having a size, for part 
of the analysans is logically equivalent to the 
analysandum. Equivalences such as this are ruled out 
by condition (d). 
It has often been said that in an analysis the 
analysans and the analysandum express the same concept 
but express it in different ways. The notions of 
compositional and structural identity developed here 
provide a way of making sense of this claim. 
In analyzing a concept or proposition, one is 
trying to make explicit what is implicitly contained in 
our understanding of that concept or proposition. 
Finding good analyses, however, is notoriously 
difficult. Perhaps the reason that analysis is so 
difficult is that our language is not rich enough to 
express each concept that is implicitly contained in 
the concepts we possess. Perhaps the reason is that 
philosophical terms are primitive or simple and thus 
cannot be "broken down" into constituent concepts. 
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Perhaps the reason is that philosophical terms are more 
like natural kind words than nominal kind words in that 
their meaning varies from speaker to speaker and hence 
cannot be analyzed. And perhaps the reason is that 
philosophers just have not been clever enough. 
Brown University 
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